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 NOTE 
Check Yes for Checkpoints: Suspicionless 
Stops and Ramifications for Missouri 
Motorists 
State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied (Mo. June 
28, 2016) 
Conner Harris* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the great advantages of living in a free society is the enjoyment of 
general privacy and freedom from unwarranted interference in one’s personal 
affairs.  This advantage benefits citizens in both their private and public inter-
actions.  For example, it is expected one could drive to the store across town, 
the mall in a neighboring city, or somewhere on the other side of the country 
uninterrupted and unhindered.  The primary exception to this privacy expecta-
tion is that engaging in conduct that violates the law can warrant a stop and 
seizure by law enforcement.1 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution codifies this 
privacy expectation as a right to be enjoyed by all within its reach.2  Specifi-
cally, the Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.”3  Drawing the line between reasonable and unreasonable is a task with 
which courts often wrestle.  This line has a direct impact on how police officers 
perform searches and seizures and how the subjects of those searches and sei-
zures are treated in the criminal justice system. 
A general component of Fourth Amendment reasonableness is an indi-
vidualized suspicion of wrongdoing.4  However, police checkpoints – desig-
nated locations which require passing vehicles to stop and submit to a police 
 
* B.A., Truman State University, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2018; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018.  I would 
like to extend a special thank you to Associate Dean Paul Litton for his comments, as 
well as the entire Missouri Law Review staff for their support and guidance in writing 
this Note. 
 1. Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1609, 1613 (2012). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 4. Jason Fiebig, Comment, Police Checkpoints: Lack of Guidance from the Su-
preme Court Contributes to Disregard of Civil Liberties in the District of Columbia, 
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 599, 606 (2010). 
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officer’s questioning – have been upheld as constitutional in both federal and 
state courts as a permissible method of instigating a seizure without individu-
alized suspicion.5  Checkpoint jurisprudence at the federal level has not yet 
resulted in concrete requirements for reasonableness, but there are general un-
derlying principles.6  Missouri courts have likewise abstained from providing 
any sort of checklist before a checkpoint may be considered reasonable7 but 
instead seem to judge each checkpoint on a case-by-case basis, often yielding 
inconsistent results.8  A recent decision by the Missouri Court of Appeals, 
Southern District, State v. Biggerstaff, indicates that checkpoints designed to 
enforce vehicle equipment laws, also known as enforcement checkpoints, may 
be set up at any location, at a moment’s notice, and for an indefinite duration.9 
This Note explores and discusses the repercussions of this decision.  Part 
II of this Note explores the facts of State v. Biggerstaff in detail.  Part III ana-
lyzes the constitutionality of police checkpoints under federal law and in the 
state of Missouri.  Part IV examines the reasoning and holding of the Southern 
District of Missouri in State v. Biggerstaff.  Finally, Part V comments on the 
Southern District of Missouri’s rationale in reaching its holding, as well as how 
this decision will apply to motorists in the future. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Stacy Biggerstaff was stopped on April 17, 2013, in the early afternoon 
at an equipment enforcement checkpoint in Taney County, Missouri.10  The 
checkpoint’s purpose “was to enforce traffic safety laws, with a focus on driver 
qualification and the condition of the motor vehicles’ safety equipment.”11  Ev-
idence obtained during the stop resulted in Biggerstaff being charged with pos-
session of a controlled substance, driving while intoxicated, and driving with a 
suspended license.12  Prior to trial, Biggerstaff motioned to suppress evidence 
resulting from the traffic stop on the grounds that the checkpoint violated state 
and federal constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.13 
Two relevant documents were admitted into evidence: General Order 64-
02, which was promulgated by the Missouri Highway Patrol, and Special Order 
24, which was issued by and applicable only to Troop D, the branch of the 
 
 5. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000). 
 6. See Fiebig, supra note 4, at 605–12. 
 7. State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513, 514 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied (Mo. 
June 28, 2016). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 515. 
 10. Id. at 513. 
 11. Id. at 515. 
 12. Id. at 513. 
 13. Id. at 514. 
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Missouri Highway Patrol with jurisdiction over Taney County.14  Both orders 
laid out general guidelines for conducting checkpoints.15  The special order 
included a list of approved locations for checkpoints during daylight hours.16  
The locations were “selected by zone supervisors for the purpose of reducing 
property damage, injuries, and deaths caused by unqualified drivers and defec-
tive equipment on motor vehicles.”17  Deciding checkpoint location was a mat-
ter of convenience, “the actual choice [of checkpoint location] would then be 
made based upon where the troopers to be used to man the checkpoint were 
working at that time.”18 
The checkpoint itself consisted of two police cars, both with their emer-
gency lights activated.19  The officers on site stood in the roadway wearing 
police uniforms and reflective vests.20  Additionally, “[e]very vehicle that ap-
proached the checkpoint was stopped.”21  The stops took as little as thirty sec-
onds and consisted of a routine driver’s license check plus an officer checking 
the functionality of one piece of vehicle safety equipment, such as a turn sig-
nal.22  Biggerstaff did not have a driver’s license when she was stopped at the 
checkpoint and was directed to pull over so the officer could further investi-
gate.23  It was during this investigation that the officer determined that Big-
gerstaff was intoxicated.24  She was subsequently arrested and charged.25  Big-
gerstaff motioned to suppress evidence obtained from this checkpoint on the 
grounds that it was unconstitutional.26 
Biggerstaff argued three primary issues at trial: (1) the location of the 
checkpoint was not determined using specific data; (2) the checkpoint was con-
ducted without written procedures; and (3) there were no signs, signal flares, 
or otherwise sufficient forms of notice to warn approaching traffic of the check-
point.27  The court found that two of Biggerstaff’s three main contentions – a 
lack of written instruction and sufficient notice – were directly refuted by the 
evidence in the case.28  The court further noted that it was not a requirement 
for a checkpoint’s location to be selected based on specific data indicating 
 
 14. Record on Appeal – Transcript at 7–8, Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513 (Mo. Ct. 
App.), transfer denied (Mo. June 28, 2016) (No. SD 34001). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 515. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 515–16. 
 25. Id. at 516. 
 26. Id. at 514. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 516. 
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heightened probabilities of criminal violations.29  Location was merely one fac-
tor to consider in a balancing test.30  The trial court found that the checkpoint 
was not unreasonable and denied Biggerstaff’s motion to suppress evidence.31  
Upon her subsequent conviction, Biggerstaff appealed this denial to the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals, Southern District.  The Southern District of Missouri 
affirmed the trial court and held that the checkpoint was not unconstitutional 
because Biggerstaff failed to show that the checkpoint was unreasonable.32 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Individualized Suspicion and Reasonableness 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, “The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”33  The anal-
ogous section of the Missouri Constitution states, “[T]he people shall be secure 
in their persons, papers, homes, effects, and electronic communications and 
data, from unreasonable searches and seizures.”34  The prohibition against only 
“unreasonable” searches and seizures indicates that reasonable searches and 
seizures are acceptable.35  The reasonableness of a law enforcement action “is 
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment inter-
ests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”36 
The Fourth Amendment’s demand for reasonableness relies heavily on an 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.37  Individualized suspicion is “the 
idea that the state should judge each citizen based upon his own unique actions, 
character, thoughts, and situation,” and not “on stereotypes, assumptions, guilt-
by-association, or other generalities.”38  Individualized suspicion is the “beat-
ing heart” that keeps people secure in their person and property and deters un-
reasonable government intrusion.39  Its purpose is to limit the amount of dis-
cretion a law enforcement officer may use.40  For example, in Delaware v. 
Prouse, the Court held that roving traffic stops cannot occur without at least 
reasonable suspicion that the driver is violating the law or is subject to a lawful  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 514. 
 32. Id. at 516. 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 34. MO. CONST. art. I, § 15. 
 35. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
 36. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). 
 37. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997). 
 38. Andrew E. Taslitz, What is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care?: The 
Costs, Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
145, 146 (2010). 
 39. See id. at 145. 
 40. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39. 
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seizure.41  This was in part because traveling in automobiles is an everyday 
occurrence for many Americans, and their expectation of privacy necessarily 
follows them to their automobile in order to preserve the integrity of the Fourth 
Amendment.42 
Police stops are considered seizures for constitutional purposes.43  Gen-
erally speaking, searches and seizures conducted without individualized suspi-
cion of wrongdoing are unreasonable.44  However, under very limited condi-
tions, suspicionless stops are considered reasonable.45  Fixed police check-
points have been upheld in both federal and state courts as a reasonable method 
of instigating a seizure without individualized suspicion.46 
B.  Supreme Court Rulings on Checkpoints 
The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld checkpoints with spe-
cific primary purposes, such as intercepting illegal aliens at international bor-
ders47 and locating intoxicated drivers and removing them from the road.48  In 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Supreme Court upheld a checkpoint lo-
cated near the United States’s southern border because, despite fairly intrusive 
stops requiring passengers to present certain documents and answer personal 
questions, the United States government had an incredibly strong interest in 
securing its border.49  In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Su-
preme Court upheld a checkpoint designed to stop drunk driving because the 
intrusion was relatively small – the average delay was twenty-five seconds50 – 
compared to the State’s interest in keeping drunk drivers off the road.51 
However, even these reasonable checkpoints must meet minimum criteria 
to pass muster.52  A constitutional checkpoint bars an officer from exercising 
“standardless and unconstrained discretion.”53  In general, the primary purpose 
of the checkpoint must be “closely related to the problems of policing the bor-
der or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety.”54  
 
 41. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. 
 42. Id. at 662–63. 
 43. See id. at 653. 
 44. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 40. 
 47. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976). 
 48. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990). 
 49. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556. 
 50. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448. 
 51. Id. at 455. 
 52. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–43 (2000). 
 53. Id. at 39 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)). 
 54. Id. at 41.  But see Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 421 (2004) (upholding a 
checkpoint stop when the purpose was to gather information from motorists and not to 
identify unlawful conduct). 
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The Supreme Court case City of Indianapolis v. Edmond involved a 
checkpoint designated to intercept illegal drugs.55  The checkpoint was oper-
ated by approximately thirty officers pursuant to formal instructions issued by 
the chief of police.56  When a motorist stopped at the checkpoint, a drug dog 
walked around the vehicle and sniffed for illegal narcotics.57  The checkpoint’s 
location was selected in advance based on crime statistics and traffic flow 
data.58  Signs were also posted to notify motorists of the checkpoint’s loca-
tion.59 
The Court took no issue with how the checkpoint was conducted.60  In-
stead, it held that the checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment because its 
primary purpose was to “uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdo-
ing.”61  According to the Court, confiscating drugs did not immediately serve 
the purpose of securing the border or preserving roadway safety.62  The gov-
ernment argued that all checkpoints ultimately share the goal of arresting sus-
pected criminals.63  The Court warned that permitting a checkpoint with such 
a broadly stated purpose would allow checkpoints to be set up at the whim of 
law enforcement.64  Regulating the purpose of suspicionless intrusions is rele-
vant because it deters abusive police conduct.65  To combat situations where 
police administer checkpoints with impermissible purposes under the guise of 
lawful stated purposes, the Court must consider all available evidence to deter-
mine the primary purpose of the checkpoint.66  Without this judicial safeguard, 
suspicionless stops would occur with undue regularity, and a primary purpose 
of the Fourth Amendment would be rendered moot.67 
C.  Checkpoint Law in Missouri 
In Missouri, the law on checkpoints is largely the same as federal law.68  
The provision contained in the Missouri Constitution that protects against un-
reasonable searches and seizures is “interpreted to provide essentially the same 
 
 55. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34. 
 56. Id. at 35. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 35–36. 
 60. Id. at 40. 
 61. Id. at 41–42. 
 62. Id. at 42. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 47. 
 66. Id. at 46–47. 
 67. Id. at 42. 
 68. See State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 626–27, 631 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
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protection found in the [F]ourth [A]mendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.”69  Missouri courts share the Supreme Court’s conclusions regarding the 
constitutionality of checkpoints.70  Two Missouri cases are frequently cited 
when Missouri checkpoints are at issue.71  One, State v. Welch, is an example 
of how to design a reasonable, court-approved checkpoint.72  The other, State 
v. Canton, is an adept illustration of precisely how not to conduct a check-
point.73 
State v. Welch involved a sobriety checkpoint that was designed accord-
ing to a prepared plan and operated by supervisory personnel belonging to 
Troop F of the Missouri Highway Patrol.74  Previously collected data indicated 
the checkpoint’s location was an area where frequent alcohol-related accidents 
occurred.75  A command officer of Troop F personally issued the order to con-
duct the checkpoint, which included “specific guidelines, locations, and times 
to be followed by field personnel.”76  All personnel assigned to work the check-
point met prior to its commencement to discuss their duties and received 
printouts of the commanding officer’s order to consult.77  This order also set 
protocols for various situations that may arise during the checkpoint, such as if 
traffic slowed to the point of unreasonably delaying travelers.78 
Furthermore, a sign reading “Sobriety Checkpoint Ahead” was posted to 
notify oncoming traffic of the checkpoint, and signal flares were placed along 
the roadside to guide approaching vehicles.79  Police cars were positioned 
around the area of the checkpoint with their emergency lights activated, and 
officers wearing reflective vests directed traffic with flashlights.80  All of these 
factors contributed to the court’s finding that the checkpoint was constitu-
tional.81 
On the other hand, the court found that the checkpoint in State v. Canton 
was unreasonable because it lacked nearly every factor of reasonableness found 
in Welch.82  The checkpoint in Canton was designated to check for vehicle 
defects, the validity of the operator’s license, and intoxicated drivers.83  It 
lacked any prior notice and consisted of only two patrol cars with flashing 
 
 69. Id. at 631 (quoting State v. Sweeney, 701 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Mo. 1985) (en 
banc)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 624; State v. Canton, 775 S.W.2d 352 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). 
 72. Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 625–26. 
 73. Canton, 775 S.W.2d at 352–53. 
 74. Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 625. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 632. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 632–33. 
 79. Id. at 631. 
 80. Id. at 625. 
 81. Id. at 633. 
 82. State v. Canton, 775 S.W.2d 352, 353–54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). 
 83. Id. at 353. 
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emergency lights and two officers with flashlights.84  The number of officers 
was problematic because the checkpoint had to cease its operation whenever a 
violation was suspected.85  The checkpoint’s location was decided by “the orig-
inating officer on some non-defined general awareness that some arrests had 
occurred in the area” and not by specific data.86  The officers involved were 
not adequately trained nor were there established guidelines for conducting the 
checkpoint.87  Under the circumstances, “[a] driver approaching the scene 
would have no idea what was occurring, what his response should be, or why 
he was being stopped.”88 
Welch and Canton leave us with two extreme examples of checkpoints 
but not a lot of middle ground.  Ultimately, the validity of a checkpoint “is 
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment inter-
ests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”89  Balancing 
tests require that certain factors be considered in determining reasonableness – 
not that certain elements be satisfied.90  Not all of the factors considered in 
Welch need to be present for a checkpoint to be considered valid.91 
Another Supreme Court of Missouri case, State v. Damask, reiterated the 
importance of proper notice and a logical location.92  The Damask checkpoint 
featured large illuminated signs that warned of an approaching checkpoint.93  
The court stated that notice reduces the intrusion of the stop to the motorist on 
a subjective level by alleviating potential concern or surprise.94  Hence, “there 
should be some prior notice of the existence of the checkpoint.”95 
The actual location of the checkpoint in Damask was situated at a traffic-
controlled intersection at the end of an exit ramp.96  The signs were purposely 
ambiguous so that motorists might think that the checkpoint was straight ahead 
on the interstate, past the exit ramp.97  The exit led to few advertised roadway 
services, making it more likely that those who did exit were attempting to avoid 
the perceived checkpoint on the interstate, only to find themselves stopped at 
a checkpoint on the exit ramp.98  The court approved of this location because 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 354. 
 86. Id. at 353. 
 87. Id. at 354. 
 88. Id. 
 89. State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 633. 
 92. State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 575 (Mo. 1996) (en banc). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 574. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 575. 
 97. Id. at 568. 
 98. Id. 
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it considered a controlled intersection to be a relatively safe place to stop vehi-
cles and because the location specifically targeted drug couriers expected to 
prematurely exit from their route to avoid law enforcement.99  After consider-
ing these factors, the court upheld the checkpoint because “[t]he checkpoint 
plan and operation virtually eliminated the officers’ discretion in stopping ve-
hicles.”100 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION  
In Biggerstaff, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, deter-
mined that the checkpoint at issue was constitutional after balancing the rele-
vant interests.101  Essentially, the Biggerstaff checkpoint had enough factors to 
tip the scale of the balancing test toward reasonableness, despite not possessing 
all of the Welch factors.102 
Biggerstaff argued that the checkpoint was unreasonable for three rea-
sons.103  First, unlike in Welch, the checkpoint did not provide sufficient notice 
to motorists.104  Welch was held constitutional in part because of the notice 
provided to motorists.105  In Welch, a sign reading “Sobriety Checkpoint 
Ahead” was displayed alongside the road before motorists encountered the 
checkpoint and illuminated signal flares were placed at the checkpoint’s loca-
tion, where officers with reflective vests and flashlights guided traffic.106  Big-
gerstaff argued that the notice was insufficient because it was less apparent 
than in Welch.107 
While not expressly commenting on the specific issue of notice, the court 
adopted the position of the trial court by stating that the evidence available 
“refutes Defendant’s claims that no . . . signs or other warnings were given to 
drivers about the checkpoint.”108  The two police cars parked on the side of the 
road with their emergency lights activated provided enough notice to satisfy 
the court.109 
Second, Biggerstaff argued that “no written procedures were imple-
mented and provided to field personnel.”110  The court rejected this argument 
outright, pointing to the State’s Exhibit 8 in evidence, which included both 
 
 99. Id. at 575. 
 100. Id. 
 101. State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied (Mo. 
June 28, 2016). 
 102. Id. at 515. 
 103. Id. at 514. 
 104. Id. 
 105. State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 633 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
 106. Id. at 625. 
 107. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 514. 
 108. Id. at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 109. Id. at 515. 
 110. Id. at 514. 
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Special Order 24 and General Order 64-02, two documents that provided gen-
eral guidelines for conducting checkpoints.111 
The court did not analyze the caliber of instruction provided by the Spe-
cial Order or General Order, and the court seemed satisfied that any level of 
instruction guided the effectuation of the checkpoint.112  The court noted that 
prior to conducting the checkpoint, the officers involved “met together briefly 
. . . and they went over how [the checkpoint] was to be conducted.”113 
Third, Biggerstaff argued that the checkpoint was unreasonable because 
its location was not chosen based on specific data indicating high rates of ille-
gal activity or accidents.114  The court recognized that this was true but found 
a caveat in Special Order 24 that contained a list of approved checkpoint loca-
tions.115  These locations were approved by a Zone Supervisor in the Troop at 
the recommendation of other officers.116  While it was not based on scientifi-
cally-gathered data, the pre-approved list of locations weighed in favor of rea-
sonableness.117 
Regardless of how the checkpoint location was decided, the court ex-
pressly declared that specific data was not required when choosing the location 
for a checkpoint because “Welch does not require such evidence, and the 
checkpoint in Canton was not found to be constitutionally deficient solely be-
cause of the lack of [specific data].”118  Ultimately, the court’s decision to up-
hold the checkpoint rested on its assertion that Biggerstaff did not adequately 
demonstrate that law enforcement officers had unbridled discretion in conduct-
ing this checkpoint.119 
V.  COMMENT 
Biggerstaff departed from precedent in several ways.  First, it moved the 
fulcrum of the balancing test so that the state’s interests prevailed.  Second, the 
notice factor was gutted and rendered practically meaningless.  Third, the court 
was very deferential to the police orders that authorized the checkpoint.  This 
deference significantly diminished the importance of logically selecting a 
checkpoint’s location.  Fourth, Biggerstaff upheld a checkpoint with a gener-
ally stated purpose.  Finally, the Biggerstaff checkpoint permitted unbridled 
police discretion in almost every facet of its operation. 
 
 111. Id. at 515. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 514. 
 115. Id. at 515. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 516. 
 119. Id. 
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A.  A Balancing Test: State Interest vs. Fourth Amendment Intrusion 
A law enforcement officer’s search or seizure of an individual is only 
lawful if it is reasonable.120  A reasonable search or seizure occurs when the 
state’s interests outweigh the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests.121  In 
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme Court of the United 
States permitted suspicionless seizures at checkpoints designed to target drunk 
drivers.122  However, the Court has since limited the extent of that power by 
holding that checkpoints designed merely to detect general criminal wrongdo-
ing are unconstitutional.123  In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court iden-
tified specific circumstances under which suspicionless seizures would be ac-
ceptable, stating “[o]nly with respect to a smaller class of offenses, however, is 
society confronted with the type of immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and 
limb that the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz was designed to eliminate.”124 
The state’s interest in stopping drunk driving is strong due to the enor-
mous danger drunk drivers bring to the roadways.125  The Court used illustra-
tive language to describe exactly what conduct the state is most compelled to 
stop, even at the temporary expense of individual privacy interests.126  A defi-
nition of “immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and limb” is not provided by 
the Court, but the plain meaning indicates that the Court is addressing only 
issues of roadway safety that impose a present and substantial risk of serious 
bodily harm.127  A threat such as drunk driving qualifies as such a risk because 
alcohol significantly impairs one’s cognitive and motor functions, which 
makes operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol an extraordi-
narily dangerous task.128 
The state’s interest was significantly weaker in Biggerstaff where the pur-
pose of the checkpoint was merely to check the equipment of a motorist’s ve-
hicle to ensure its functionality.129  While it is undeniable that a vehicle is safer 
if all of its signaling equipment is working properly, a defective turn signal 
does not capture the urgency of the “immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life 
and limb” with which the Edmond Court was so concerned.130  In fact, trial 
court testimony from an officer on the scene indicated that there was no reason 
for a turn signal to be activated at the location of the checkpoint because it was 
 
 120. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979). 
 121. Id. at 654. 
 122. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990). 
 123. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000). 
 124. Id. at 43 (emphasis added). 
 125. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43. 
 128. Alcohol and Driving, ALCOHOL & DRUG FOUND., http://adf.org.au/insights/al-
cohol-and-driving/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2017). 
 129. Record on Appeal – Transcript, supra note 14, at 6. 
 130. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43. 
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a straight stretch of road.131  A defective turn signal in that circumstance cer-
tainly does not meet the temporal element of “immediacy,” let alone the label 
of “vehicle-bound threat to life and limb.”132 
Furthermore, the state’s interest in maintaining roadway safety through 
properly functioning safety equipment is already served to a certain degree be-
cause Missouri requires all vehicles registered in the state to submit to regular 
vehicle inspections.133  In Prouse, the Supreme Court used a similar rationale 
when it held that roving suspicionless stops were unconstitutional.134  The 
Court further stated that even out-of-state vehicles need not arouse suspicion 
or be stopped because the states in which they are registered likely have similar 
minimum safety requirements as the required vehicle inspection.135  The 
Prouse court was adamant that “[t]he marginal contribution to roadway safety 
possibly resulting from a system of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every 
occupant of every vehicle on the roads to a seizure.” 136 
Prouse is distinguishable from checkpoint cases because it involved rov-
ing suspicionless traffic stops – seizures enacted by actively patrolling offic-
ers.137  Checkpoints are static;138 however, the Prouse decision requires a pow-
erful justification to stop drivers without suspicion.139 Prouse maintains that 
even if discretion is eliminated by stopping “every occupant of every vehicle,” 
the state’s interests do not outweigh any individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.140  Essentially, even the complete elimination of police discretion does 
not alone make a stop constitutional.141  This rationale applies to the Biggerstaff 
checkpoint because every driver who passed that checkpoint was stopped.142 
The Prouse Court’s observation that these stops only provide a “marginal 
contribution to roadway safety”143 places them far below the Edmond Court’s 
“immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and limb” standard.144  These stops 
also do not meet the requirements of the Welch court, which provided “essen-
tially the same” protection as the Fourth Amendment.145  Biggerstaff departed 
from precedent by relaxing the standard for suspicionless stops and finding that 
 
 131. Record on Appeal – Transcript, supra note 14, at 39. 
 132. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43. 
 133. MO. REV. STAT. § 307.350 (2016). 
 134. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660–61 (1979). 
 135. Id. at 661. 
 136. Id. (emphasis added).  
 137. See id. at 656–58. 
 138. Id. at 663. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 661. 
 141. Id. 
 142. State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513, 515 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied (Mo. 
June 28, 2016). 
 143. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661. 
 144. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43 (2000). 
 145. State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 631 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (quoting State v. 
Sweeney, 701 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)). 
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the state’s interest in conducting equipment enforcement checkpoints out-
weighed an individual’s privacy expectation. 
B.  The Notice Factor 
A number of factors are considered when a court determines the consti-
tutionality of a checkpoint.146  These factors include: whether or not there was 
a specific plan of action in conducting the checkpoint; how closely that plan 
was followed; the amount of prior notice given to motorists; the reason for the 
location of the checkpoint; and the general room for the exercise of officer 
discretion.147  Biggerstaff upheld the constitutionality of the checkpoint at issue 
despite the weight of these factors – most notably notice and checkpoint loca-
tion – being significantly less than in Welch.148 
Biggerstaff’s comment on notice creates a major concern pertaining to the 
constitutionality of checkpoints.  That concern is the subjective intrusion im-
posed on motorists.149  Subjective intrusion is defined as “the amount of dis-
cretion available to the officers in operating the checkpoint and the extent to 
which a stop may generate concern or fright on the part of lawful travelers.”150  
A motorist’s expectation of privacy includes an expectation of freedom from 
arbitrary invasions including subjective intrusions.151  Prior notice would alle-
viate the issue of concern or fright by providing a motorist with a prior expla-
nation for the stop and lessen the degree of subjective intrusion.152 
The Biggerstaff court held that the presence of police officers and police 
vehicles with activated emergency lights sufficed as notice,153 despite the Can-
ton court’s concern that drivers should be able to reasonably discern that they 
are entering a checkpoint.154  The mere presence of police officers and their 
vehicles on the side of the road may look substantially similar to any investi-
gatory stop or law enforcement practice.  Without more to indicate that a check-
point is in effect – such as signs, illuminated flares, or notice published in the 
local paper – motorists may question why they are being directed to pull 
over.155  The Supreme Court of Missouri has advocated for proper notice for 
checkpoints as a means to lessen the degree to which checkpoints “generate 
concern or fright.”156  In State v. Damask, the court drew an unambiguous con-
clusion regarding notice, noting that “there should be some prior notice of the  
 146. Id. at 632–33. 
 147. Id. 
 148. State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied (Mo. 
June 28, 2016). 
 149. State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 573–74 (Mo. 1996) (en banc). 
 150. Id. at 573. 
 151. Id. at 571. 
 152. Id. at 574. 
 153. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 515–16. 
 154. State v. Canton, 775 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 574. 
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existence of the checkpoint.”157  Damask transformed notice from a factor into 
a requirement. 
Biggerstaff’s rationale regarding notice is tautological; if mere visibility 
of police cars and officers provides sufficient notice, then notice is almost al-
ways sufficient.  Unless the cars are completely hidden from view, they will 
always be visible as drivers approach them, and a court following Biggerstaff 
could conclude that motorists were adequately alerted to the existence and na-
ture of the checkpoint.  There must be something more to the notice require-
ment that Damask alluded to than the bare minimum standard Biggerstaff pro-
vides; otherwise, there is little value in considering notice in a reasonableness 
analysis. 
C.  The Need for a Plan 
The use of a designed plan for conducting checkpoints is also frequently 
cited as a factor for courts to consider.158  In Biggerstaff, the court deferred 
heavily to the police special orders and did not question whether the six pages 
of checkpoint locations were logical.159  These locations were approved by su-
perior officers at the suggestions of lower ranked officers,160 but the court did 
not question the methodology of selecting locations.161  This suggests that of-
ficers may approve any location with the understanding that the court will not 
step in. 
Testimony from an officer who worked the checkpoint at issue indicated 
that in practice, the checkpoint’s location depends upon where officers are lo-
cated at the time.162  When and where a checkpoint will be is decided approxi-
mately one hour before vehicles are first stopped at the checkpoint.163  The 
court had no issue with this timeframe but gave no guidance as to whether a 
time lapse was necessary or if checkpoints could be set up spontaneously.164  
The court again showed deference to the discretion of law enforcement on a 
matter where discretion is explicitly intended to be minimized.165 
In fact, the court went a step beyond deferring to the special order.  It 
completely waived the location factor from its consideration.166  Prior to Big-
gerstaff, checkpoint jurisprudence in Missouri either indicated that a location 
should be selected because collected data indicated heightened rates of traffic  
 157. Id. (emphasis added). 
 158. See id. at 574; Canton, 775 S.W.2d at 354; State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 
633 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
 159. State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513, 515–16 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied 
(Mo. June 28, 2016). 
 160. Record on Appeal – Transcript, supra note 14, at 11. 
 161. See Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 515–16. 
 162. Record on Appeal – Transcript, supra note 14, at 30. 
 163. Id. at 28–29. 
 164. See Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 515–16. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. 
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violations in the area167 or because the layout of the checkpoint prioritized 
safety and would primarily target criminals.168  The location of the Canton 
checkpoint was not logically selected and was held unconstitutional.169  The 
creators of the Biggerstaff checkpoint did not rely on specific data when decid-
ing on a location, and the court did not comment on whether the location was 
otherwise acceptable.170  The court acknowledged that location is one factor to 
be considered, but how the location is determined is not discussed in the court’s 
opinion.171  As indicated above, the Biggerstaff court stated, “Canton was not 
found to be constitutionally deficient solely because of the lack of [specific 
data].”172  Under Biggerstaff, a checkpoint can still be constitutional even if the 
location is not logically selected.  The abrogation of the location factor’s sig-
nificance, along with the court’s treatment of the notice factor, allows for a 
checkpoint that is quite different from the gold standard set forth in Welch.173 
D.  General vs. Specific Purpose 
Checkpoint standards are ultimately derived from the fundamental com-
ponents of the Fourth Amendment and the general prohibition against suspi-
cionless stops.174  Checkpoints provide a narrow exception to this prohibition, 
and the Supreme Court reminds us that it is indeed narrow: 
 
If we were to rest the case at this high level of generality, there would 
be little check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks 
for almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose. Without drawing 
the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in 
crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such 
intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life.175 
 
Essentially, the less specific a checkpoint’s purpose, the less likely it is that it 
will be upheld as constitutional.  Biggerstaff does not conform to this rule.  
First, the equipment enforcement checkpoint in Biggerstaff had a purpose that 
appeared to be serving the general interest of crime control and not the specific 
Supreme Court-approved purposes of policing the border or ensuring roadway 
safety.176  Its primary purpose was to “reduce property damage, injuries, and 
 
 167. See State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 632 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
 168. See State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 575 (Mo. 1996) (en banc). 
 169. State v. Canton, 775 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). 
 170. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 515–16. 
 171. See id. 
 172. Id. at 516. 
 173. See State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
 174. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
 175. Id. at 42.  The term “roadblock” here is used interchangeably with “check-
point.” 
 176. Id. at 41. 
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deaths caused by unqualified or unsafe drivers and defective equipment on mo-
tor vehicles.”177 
Not only was this purpose facially general, it exceeded the general interest 
of crime control.  The population of “unqualified or unsafe drivers” could en-
compass nearly everyone, depending on where the line is drawn.  While driving 
with defective equipment is a criminal violation, being merely an “unsafe” 
driver is generally not.  Driving with music blaring is potentially “unsafe,”178 
but it is not unlawful or criminal.  The court offered no guidance regarding how 
to define these terms and was apparently content with a checkpoint that was 
originated to detect “unsafe” drivers.179  The Biggerstaff checkpoint’s stated 
purpose was even more general than that of the unconstitutional checkpoint in 
Edmond, which at least targeted a type of criminal wrongdoing.180 
Second, these broad enforcement checkpoints are easier to set up in Mis-
souri than checkpoints with specific purposes, such as sobriety checkpoints.181  
Enforcement checkpoints may be approved by a zone supervisor or assistant 
zone supervisor on site and require no further approval from Troop Headquar-
ters.182  In contrast, sobriety checkpoints are governed by a separate order from 
enforcement checkpoints and require authorization from Troop Headquarters 
before being conducted.183  This produces an incentive for law enforcement to 
set up general purpose enforcement checkpoints instead of specifically tailored 
sobriety checkpoints.  As Biggerstaff demonstrates, officers at enforcement 
checkpoints are still capable of making drunk driving arrests,184 and they do 
not have to jump through extra hoops to create sobriety checkpoints, which 
achieve the same ends.  This practice sharply contrasts with the Edmond deci-
sion that warned of the potential dangers of allowing law enforcement to spon-
taneously set up checkpoints.185 
E.  Back to Basics 
Each of the issues discussed are problematic on their own; when aggre-
gated, a new singular concern arises with the Biggerstaff decision.  Biggerstaff 
reverts to pre-Prouse territory when roving suspicionless stops were not con-
stitutionally constrained.  Biggerstaff has upheld enforcement checkpoints with 
 
 177. Record on Appeal – Transcript, supra note 14, at 33. 
 178. See Warren Brodsky & Zack Slor, Background Music as a Risk Factor for 
Distraction Among Young-Novice Drivers, 59 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 382 
(2013). 
 179. State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513, 515–16 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied 
(Mo. June 28, 2016).  
 180. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41. 
 181. Record on Appeal – Transcript, supra note 14, at 40. 
 182. Id. at 11–12. 
 183. Id. at 40. 
 184. Id. at 9; Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 513. 
 185. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42. 
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general purposes.186  These checkpoints can be set up on site by anyone with a 
sufficient rank and without approval from Troop Headquarters.187  A lack of 
meaningful notice combined with a court’s complete deference, or even indif-
ference, to a checkpoint’s location opens the door for these checkpoints to be 
set up at anytime, anywhere. 
A bit of creativity would transform Biggerstaff into a powerful law en-
forcement tool for effectuating seizures without the requisite individualized 
suspicion.  Police could essentially target a vehicle, or person therein, and place 
a checkpoint on its predicted path.  The stated purpose of the stop would be to 
conduct a standard enforcement checkpoint, but in reality it would only be a 
pretext188 for further investigation.  This practice is not quite the same as the 
roving stops that Prouse discontinued because the officers would be operating 
from static checkpoints instead of moving patrol vehicles, but it is only one 
step removed.  In stark contrast to established precedent, the location of the 
checkpoint and the individual to be stopped are left to the unbridled discretion 
of the officers at the scene.189  This is antithetical to the notion that constitu-
tional checkpoints are those crafted precisely to minimize “standardless and 
unconstrained discretion.”190 
Unconstrained discretion allows certain biases, whether deliberate or im-
plicit, to surface.  For example, research suggests that African-Americans are 
disproportionately stopped by police compared to Caucasians.191  While racial 
profiling by law enforcement is technically unlawful, evidence resulting from 
an otherwise reasonable seizure is not deemed inadmissible simply because of 
perceived racial profiling.192  The subjective motives of police are irrelevant 
when considering the reasonableness of the seizure.193  All that matters is that 
 
 186. See Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 516. 
 187. Record on Appeal – Transcript, supra note 14, at 40. 
 188. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996).  Police stops are labeled 
as “pretext” stops when their given reason does not align with the subjective motives 
of the officer.  Id.  For example, an officer may pull a motorist over for speeding be-
cause the officer suspects the motorist is a drug courier.  The traffic stop for speeding 
was only a pretext so that the officer can further investigate his or her suspicions.  These 
types of stops are lawful because the subjective thoughts of a police officer have no 
bearing on whether a law enforcement practice is objectively reasonable.  Id. 
 189. See Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 515–16. 
 190. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 
(1979)). 
 191. See, e.g., Steven Hayle et al., Race, Street Life, and Policing: Implications for 
Racial Profiling, 58 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 322, 337–38 (2016); 
Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Policy Department’s “Stop-
and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N. 
813, 814 (2007). 
 192. Lewis R. Katz, Whren at Twenty: Systemic Racial Bias and the Criminal Jus-
tice System, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 923, 928 (2016). 
 193. Id. 
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the requisite reasonable suspicion be met prior to the effectuation of the sei-
zure.194 
Profiling also occurs in other forms.195  Profiling of out-of-state drivers is 
a growing concern now that that there are inconsistent marijuana laws across 
the country.196  A recent Tenth Circuit decision ruled that reasonable suspicion 
does not arise simply because a driver is a resident of a state that has legalized 
recreational marijuana, and it further decries targeting drivers because of their 
out-of-state license plates.197  However, Biggerstaff-approved checkpoints can 
be used to effectuate pretext stops that perpetuate racial biases, while allowing 
police to circumvent prohibitions against residency and license plate profil-
ing.198 
The checkpoint in Welch was upheld because all of the factors that were 
considered met the bar for reasonableness.199  Welch is today’s gold standard 
for Missouri checkpoints because it shows exactly how a proper checkpoint 
should operate.200  Holding each factor of a checkpoint to a high standard helps 
the overall goal of minimizing police discretion and Fourth Amendment viola-
tions.201  Biggerstaff diminished the importance of these factors, which in turn 
granted officers the exercise of greater discretion at the expense of individual 
privacy interests. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Biggerstaff decision significantly relaxed the standard normally ap-
plied to checkpoints.  Edmond provided a straightforward outline of how a con-
stitutional checkpoint should look,202 and Welch demonstrated how a constitu-
tional checkpoint operated in practice.203  The checkpoint in Biggerstaff did not 
resemble either of these examples in that it altered the traditionally used bal-
ancing test, abrogated the notice factor, weakened the need to logically select 
a checkpoint location, had a generally stated purpose, and permitted unbridled 
police discretion.204 
State v. Biggerstaff has implications for motorists in Missouri.  This type 
of checkpoint is now the checkpoint law in Missouri, despite falling short of  
 194. Id. 
 195. See Hayle et al., supra note 191, at 337–38. 
 196. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16; Adult and Medical Use of Cannabis 
Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 475B.010–475B.395 (West 2017).  
 197. Vasquez v. Lewis, 834 F.3d 1132, 1137–38 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 198. See State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513, 515–16 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer 
denied (Mo. June 28, 2016). 
 199. State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 631–32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
 200. Id. at 625, 631–32. 
 201. Id. at 627. 
 202. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40–42 (2000). 
 203. Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 625, 631–32. 
 204. See State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513, 513–16 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer 
denied (Mo. June 28, 2016). 
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standards set in Welch.205  This decision narrowed the scope of reasonableness, 
but it did not explicitly say what is unreasonable.206  This decision opened the 
door for police to conduct checkpoints wherever and whenever they want – so 
long as basic guidelines are followed.207  The Supreme Court of Missouri re-
cently declined to review Biggerstaff, meaning that as of the time of this Note, 
it is binding law across Missouri with no foreseeable chance of being over-
turned.208  Biggerstaff reduced the number of reasonableness factors that must 
be present for a checkpoint to be constitutional and gutted the present factors 
of much of their protective bite, making police stops easier to effectuate and 
subject to less scrutiny.209 
  
 
 205. Id. at 516. 
 206. Id. at 515–16. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 513–16. 
 209. Id. at 515–16. 
19
Harris: Check Yes for Checkpoints
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
924 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
 
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 17
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss3/17
